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Metaphorical Contracts and Games:
Goethe’s G€otz von Berlichingen and
Schiller’s Fiesco
Claudia Nitschke
Abstract, The question of how to devise and justify political order for a
secular age is still at the heart of political discourse today. Social
contracts provided an early political and philosophical answer to these
issues, but they also manifested themselves in eighteenth-century
German literature: This article will examine how Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe and Friedrich Schiller engaged with the specific propositions of
contractarianism (in particular Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan) in selected
scenes in G€otz von Berlichingen (1773) and Fiesco’s Conspiracy at Genoa
(1783), respectively. In their interpretation of contractarian scenarios,
Goethe and Schiller isolate the notion of utility which, they argue,
reduces complex social cooperation and interaction to game-like
scenarios, exclusively driven by calculation and rational decision making.
Goethe’s and Schiller’s morally inflected deconstruction of Hobbes’s
thought experiment affords an insight into alternative models of social
togetherness which place an emphasis on Bildung, evolution, mutuality,
and recognition.
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The question of how to devise and justify political order for a secular age is still
at the heart of political discourse today. Social contracts provided an early polit-
ical and philosophical answer to these issues and they also manifested them-
selves in eighteenth-century German literature. This article examines how
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller engage with the specific
propositions of contractarianism (in particular Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan)1 in
selected scenes in G€otz von Berlichingen (1773) and Die Verschw€orung des Fiesko
zu Genua (Fiesco’s Conspiracy at Genoa, 1783), respectively. In their interpret-
ation of contractarian scenarios, Goethe and Schiller isolate the notion of utility
which, they argue, reduces complex social cooperation and interaction to game-
like scenarios, exclusively driven by calculation and (ostensibly) rational decision
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making. In addition to this, Goethe challenges the Hobbesian notion of sover-
eignty: Hobbes introduces the Leviathan as a formidable guarantor of social
peace. Goethe by contrast develops an understanding of sovereignty (in G€otz von
Berlichingen) which anticipates aspects of Carl Schmitt’s decisionism and Giorgio
Agamben’s theory of the Homo Sacer, thus adopting a modern, even biopolitical
perspective on power. Goethe’s and Schiller’s morally inflected deconstruction of
Hobbes’s thought experiment affords an insight into alternative models of social
togetherness which place an emphasis on Bildung, evolution, mutuality, and
recognition.
At the center of this analysis also lies a closer look at the metaphor which the
plays systematically weaves into their political deliberations, or, to be more pre-
cise, through which the play renders its political agenda tangible and comprehen-
sible: namely the discussions surrounding (social) contract theory to which
Goethe’s G€otz von Berlichingen and Schiller’s Fiesco respond and which both
plays strategically undermine by taking its premises seriously. Goethe draws on
another metaphor to drive this point home: he undercuts the seemingly self-
evident contractual metaphor by tying it to a morally ambiguous game meta-
phor.2 In the following, I will look firstly at this proximity between contracts and
games in Goethe’s G€otz (1); secondly at Schiller’s main objections against the con-
structivist underpinning of the social contract (2); and finally, again with
Goethe’s G€otz in mind, a specific, emergent notion of sovereignty (3) which is at
odds with the specific narrative proposed by contractarianism.
CONTRACTS AND GAMES
Contracts as Metaphors
Susanne L€udemann examines literary strategies in social theory which help con-
ceive of society as a totality: social theory, she suggests, depends on these rhet-
orical measures, in particular metaphors. For L€udemann, the contract metaphor,
in a similar manner as other prominent societal metaphors such as organism
and mechanism, serves as an important representational mode of a society that
is increasingly difficult to perceive as a whole.3
Distinguished from the notion of an organism or a specific mechanism (such
as an automatic machine), the contract metaphor places an emphasis on the ori-
ginal contract which then regulates all social interrelations. As an imagined ori-
gin, it ends the infinite regression of historical causation by dint of a
foundational myth, a legal fiction so to speak. Such a symbolic regulation of the
social imaginary carries its own problems: in particular, the question of how cul-
ture and subjectivity interconnect. Many political theorists have examined the
shortcomings and inconsistencies of Hobbes’s contract theory; in the following, I
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will focus on a literary critique and deconstruction of his imagery. First of all, it
is striking that Hobbes’s foundational story introduces the contract metaphor as
a short-hand for a complex idea; in addition to that, and maybe more obviously,
it unfolds a specific narrative by proposing a distinct set of premises from which
it then infers seemingly incontrovertible conclusions. The two plays under scru-
tiny in this article employ specific strategies for these intersecting literary modes
(metaphor and narrative), firstly by diversifying and denaturalizing the given,
suasive narrative and, more importantly, by establishing an alternative meta-
phoric imagery.
Metaphors are particularly entangled with the intuitive perception of the
world around us; the “interaction view of metaphor”4 generally demonstrates
how they can actually generate new insights without simply highlighting similar-
ities between the source and target domain. Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s
claim that a large proportion of our abstract concepts are structured metaphoric-
ally is a long-established theory in the area of cognitive studies.5 At the same
time, they propose that the range of metaphors relating to morality and justice is
limited, as basic moral metaphors are rooted in bodily experience and social
interactions: “We have found that the source domains of our metaphors for mor-
ality are typically based on what people over history and across cultures have
seen as contributing to their well-being.”6 This connection of metaphorical repre-
sentations of justice and visceral, self-evident embodied moral concepts can be
extended to a specific conceptualization of “reason”:7 According to Hugo Mercier
and Dan Sperber, reasoning is not a solitary intellectual process and “not an
alternative to intuitive inference; reasoning is a use of intuitive inferences about
reason.”8 The contract metaphor would indeed present such an intuitive shortcut,
appealing to reason as a meta-representational inference mechanism: it formu-
lates an intuitively logical, “reasonable” concept of appropriateness and justice,
just like the social contract.
Self-Interest and Contract Theory in G€otz von Berlichingen
Goethe’s G€otz von Berlichingen was loosely modelled on the life of the imperial
knight G€otz von Berlichingen (1480–1562). G€otz’s autobiography offered a useful
blueprint for legal questions that proved relevant in the age of Goethe.9 The
major socio-political changes that cast their shadows in the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries were mirrored in the fundamental historical shifts in the eight-
eenth century at the time Goethe was writing G€otz (culminating not much later
in the American and French Revolution). The play itself broke new ground as a
radical Sturm und Drang tragedy which provocatively transcended the
Aristotelian unities of action, place and time. It shows how the highly independ-
ent G€otz is forced into submission by the new, abstract and codified laws of
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modern society, only capable of maintaining his freedom in death—this already
summarizes the plot to an extent.
In order to understand the specific overlap of contracts and games better, I
will first place an emphasis on Goetz’ antagonists, namely his former friend
Weislingen and the latter’s lover Adelheid. It was the game theorist Ken
Binmore who developed the idea of social contracts as games in his approach to
natural justice. In his two-volume Game Theory and the Social Contract (1994
and 1998) Binmore proposes a naturalistic reinterpretation of John Rawls’s ori-
ginal position, offering a synthesis of rational decision taking and self-interest. I
mention Binmore’s argument here, even though it takes another direction on the
whole, because rational decision taking and self-interest are the two motivations
that stand out in Goethe’s text as well; and, as in Binmore’s approach, they are
seen in close connection with the social contract. Rather fittingly in this connec-
tion, Adelheid is thus introduced as a cunning chess player. The overt political
and power technological connotations of this game are playfully considered by
Adelheid and the courtier Liebebrand: while Adelheid sees chess as an intellec-
tual practice, Liebebrand directly homes in on the power dynamics forcefully
expressed in the object of the game. He marvels at the idea that a king sup-
posedly promoted the invention of chess, and concludes that only an infantile
and effeminate weakling could have done so. For Liebebrand, adherence to mor-
ality and political incompetence go hand in hand; naïve rulers who are oblivious
to their precarious position are bound to overlook the political undercurrent of
the game. This impermanence of power which the scene carefully distills unmis-
takably cross-references Niccolo Machiavelli’s thoughts on retention of power in
his (obviously very different) treatises Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio
(Discourses on Livy) and Il Principe (The Prince), which were posthumously pub-
lished in 1531 and 1532, respectively.10 For Machiavelli, in the political sphere
the law of the (physically and intellectually) strongest applies; morality and just-
ice take no precedence, hence the infamous encouragement of preventive dishon-
esty: “A wise ruler [… ] cannot and should not keep his word when such an
observance would be to his disadvantage, and when the reasons that caused him
to make a promise are removed. If men were all good, this precept would not be
good. But since men are a wicked lot and will not keep their promises to you, you
likewise need not keep yours to them.”11
Based on this particular argument which places the honest ruler at a disad-
vantage Ottfried H€offe identifies a direct analogy between Machiavelli’s line of
reasoning and game theory as both prioritize an interest-driven, strategic ration-
ale.12 In a very similar way, Adelheid’s modus operandi which underlies her
qualities as a chess player and her political pursuits appears as strictly outcome-
driven: strategic thinking is vital for the expected win, or, as game theory puts
it, the expected pay-off. As the main machinator in the text, she is an important
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link through which two seemingly discrepant metaphors suddenly seem organic-
ally intertwined. With this specific emphasis in mind, her ideas indeed echo fun-
damental anthropological assumptions of Hobbes’s contractarianism, in
particular a notion of rationally implemented self-interest.13
It is instructive to take a closer look at the history of self-interest, as it tan-
gibly resurfaces in the context Adelheid's and Weislingen's intimate spheres.
Personal interest became topical long before the Anglo-Dutch philosopher
Bernard Mandeville postulated its importance in 1705. In his Fable of the Bees,
Mandeville famously shared the following observations on mankind:
They that examine into the Nature of Man, abstract from Art
and Education, may observe, that what renders him a Sociable
Animal, consists not in his desire of Company, Goodnature, Pity,
Affability, and other Graces of a fair Outside; but that his vilest
and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary
Accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and, according to the
World, the happiest and most flourishing Societies.14
Self-interest (Eigennutz) was particularly relevant in view of public interest: the lat-
ter stipulated as Johann Ferrarius suggested in 1601 “that nobody in any case ought
to look at their own benefit.”15 He assumed that harmony would naturally arise if
everyone, whilst pursuing their own tasks, avoided impeding anyone else from
attending to theirs. This notion of ‘harmonia’ entails a normative requirement for
every individual, and the public good ensuing from this was understood as a counter-
weight to the principle that Hobbes would later summarize as homo homini lupus.
The notion of public interest aimed to foster just governance and was thus
different from a more modern category of legitimation, namely the ragione di
stato, the reason of state, which was mainly intended to legitimize state actions,
but not to criticize and reflect governance.16 Self-interest under the reign of a
public interest philosophy served as an umbrella term to denounce all kinds of
anti-social behavior; coupled with public interest, the term established itself at
the core of the normative system of a society in which a stable order was
assumed and in which important tasks were allocated functionally to certain
groups, again based on the notion of a comprehensive, divinely created har-
mony.17 This organological conception of harmony which Winfried Schulze gleans
from a set of early modern texts is obviously still indebted to the medieval con-
cept of ‘statehood’.18 Following the notion of the body politic,19 Paul Negelein
compared the purpose of people in a societal context with the function of organs
in the body: from this, he deduced an obligation for people to act in alignment
with their ascribed social functions, which, he determined, proved not only nat-
ural but beneficial for everyone.20
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As early as in 1564 Leonard Fronsberger proposed similar ideas which also
partially anticipated Mandeville’s famous claim that society benefits from vices
in his Lob des Eigennutzes (Praise of Self-Interest). His thoughts resonate with
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, published only three years after Goethe’s G€otz
in 1776, as Fronsberger claimed that all economy and all private lives depended
on self-interest. As prime example he adduced marriage: nobody, he reasoned,
married because of public interest;21 marriage must rather be perceived as an
institution which accommodated basic human needs, ergo an institution basically
propelled and sustained by self-interest. Public and self-interest were intimately
interwoven in these ideas and feature as integral parts of a political concept of
community which was centered around marriage and family.
The organological metaphors used in those social self-descriptions vividly con-
vey—as hypotyposis—various aspects which are otherwise abstract, for example
totality (in the sense of completeness), continuity, functional differentiation, indi-
visibility, undisputed boundedness of the system, etc.22 Albrecht Koschorke and
Susanne L€udemann furthermore highlight that the sum of the body is more than
its separate parts, a phenomenon referred to as €Ubersummativit€at. This specific
€Ubersummativit€at does not only occur in the “body”: it can equally be created by
contracts between the social actors or by any structural continuities that emulate
the workings of machines. This metaphorical modification then helps locate a sig-
nificant conceptual shift, namely from Fronsberger or Negelein to Hobbes, from
the body to the contractual community or the notion of the state machine,23
which correlated to the development from a society that regarded itself as nat-
ural and unchangeable to a society primarily (but not exclusively) organized by
functional needs.24 While organological descriptions of society were underpinned
by a functional teleology of each organ which automatically assured easy interop-
eration, the contractual metaphor which began to superimpose (but not entirely
supplant) the body metaphor understood itself as historical and, indeed, man-
made. Consequently, the previously dominant organological and natural concep-
tion of self-interest as a part of a naturally symbiotic synergy was more or less
exhausted; instead, especially after the religious wars, the term self-interest
became a seminal category to analyze and judge individual and political actions,
as the theological and philosophical catalogue of virtues was more or less super-
seded by this new angle.25
Such reconfigured self-interest pervaded private and public areas, but also
those concerned with organizational theory. For Goethe, it serves as a tertium
comparationis which ties together Adelheid’s semi-private ambitions and
Weislingen’s politically explicit propositions. Adelheid’s comments on power and
power retention bear an obvious resemblance to the ideas Machiavelli expounds
in The Prince. Weislingen, on the other hand, takes his cue from Hobbes’s social
contract theory.26 Obviously, Hobbes’s macropolitical conclusions, arguing for and
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justifying absolutism, were derived from the devastating civil wars fought in
Europe between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.27 However, in addition
to the interest-driven politics practiced by the state, he was more generally
aware of the analytical significance of individual calculation: “of the voluntary
acts of every man the object is some Good to himselfe.”28 “For no man giveth but
with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all
Voluntary Acts the object is to every man his own Good.”29
Goethe’s play closely aligns Adelheid’s intrigue and Weislingen’s political creed,
not only because they are bound together as a couple, but rather because, for
both—in a manner similar to Hobbes’s reflections—self-interest forms the decisive
element of individual, social, and political interaction. G€otz von Berlichingen
depicts a complicated political scenario in which the imperial estates are pitted
against the head of the Holy Roman Empire with whom G€otz keeps faith. The
emperor himself is deeply aware of the potential disintegration of his empire and
strikingly connects the centrifugal tendencies to an analysis of the economical:
Thus it goes: —If a merchant loses a bag of pepper, all Germany
must be in arms; but when business occurs in which the Imperial
Majesty is interested, should it concern dukedoms, principalities,
or kingdoms, not a man must be disturbed.30
The damaging influence of particular interests comes to the fore when small per-
sonal advantages significantly compromise the emperor’s ability to assert the
public good of the Empire. In G€otz von Berlichingen, the merchants embody the
new version of self-interest which no “invisible hand”—as the emperor sees it—
directs toward universally available prosperity. On the contrary, the bag of pep-
per that the emperor symbolically singles out references a petty shortsightedness
which is bound to overlook any long-term or large-scale problems.
When G€otz breaks down the problem, however, he arrives at a simple insight:
not much would have to change, “[h]ave I not known worthy men among the prin-
ces? and can the breed be extinct?—Men happy in their own minds and in their
undertakings that could bear a petty brother in their neighbourhood without feel-
ing either dread or envy [… ]. Every one will then keep and improve his own,
instead of reckoning nothing gained that is not ravaged from their neighbours.”31
Any community, however, that is driven by a for-profit zero-sum game will disinte-
grate and dissolve the actual, organic connections between the estates and people.
Weislingen counters this notion with a very different interpretation, propos-
ing an initially convincing formula:
You [G€otz] look at the princes, just like the wolf upon the
shepherd. And yet canst thou blame them for uniting in the
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defence of their territories and property? Are they a moment
secure from the unruly chivalry of your free knights, who plunder
their vassals upon the very high-road, and sack their castles and
towns? While upon the frontiers the public enemy threatens to
overrun the lands of our dear Emperor, and, while he needs their
assistance, they can scarce maintain their own security—is it not
our good genius which at this moment suggests a mean of
bringing peace to Germany, of securing the administration of
justice, and giving to great and small the blessings of quiet? For
this purpose is the confederacy; and dost thou blame us for
securing the protection of the powerful Princes, instead of relying
on that of the Emperor, who is so far removed from us, and is
hardly able to protect himself.32
I will not dwell on the concrete political implications for the complex structure of
the Holy Roman Empire which reverberate through these reflections. Instead, I
will focus on the people’s voluntary submission to the princes—encouraged by
Weislingen—in exchange for protection and peace, which noticeably coincides
with Hobbes’s concepts of contracts and sovereignty in Leviathan. For Hobbes,
mutual contracts end the state of nature in which “there is no place for Industry;
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth,
no Navigation nor the use of commodities that may be imported by Sea; no com-
modious Building, no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as
require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time;
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short.”33
Hobbes thus emphasizes the urgency of a covenant which facilitates the tran-
sition from this so-called state of nature to a political society, a governed civil
order. However, while animals are bound by a natural agreement, “that of men,
is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be
somwhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and
lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their
actions to the Common Benefit.”34 As people’s contracts are artificial, something
else was necessary beside the covenant to ensure everyone’s adherence to it. The
power Hobbes had in mind was of course the biblically inspired sovereign
Leviathan, who was to guarantee those newly acquired rights and liberties: in a
similar vein, Weislingen envisions that the princes would do the same for
their subjects.
Drawing on Hobbesian patterns of justification (while siding with the princes
against the emperor who cannot, as Weislingen stresses, hold up his end of the
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bargain), he promises, in particular, security and welfare in exchange for political
subjugation. In so doing, Weislingen cites core elements of eighteenth-century
theories on the purpose of the state35 and theories of governmentality,36 under
which Foucault subsumes all procedures and institutions which regulate security
dispositifs and the political economy. Rationalizing governance also meant that
the metaphorical understanding of the ruler as shepherd or pastoralist shifted
towards a ratio gubernatoria, a governmental approach.37 The argument
Weislingen puts forward is thus flawed by inconsistency, as the subtly introduced
notion of a quid pro quo which forms the basis of Hobbes’s social contract under-
cuts the accessible and familiar metaphor of the prince as pastoral caretaker.
Hobbes details this quid pro quo further:
[t]he bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition,
avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some
co€ercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all
men are equall, and judges of the justeness of their own fears,
cannot possibly be supposed. And, therefore, he which performeth
first does, but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right
(he can never abandon) of defending his life; and means
of living.38
Strikingly, Hobbes’s scenario partly rephrases a classic game theoretical propos-
ition: The so-called prisoner’s dilemma is a standard example in game theory
showing why two “rational” individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears in
their best interests to do so:
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there are two players. Each has
two choices, namely cooperate or defect. Each must make the
choice without knowing what the other will do. No matter what
the other does, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation.
The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both
had cooperated.39
In this very specific scenario of non-iterated, one-on-one games, distrust and
betrayal come to dominate any cooperative strategy. This would not apply to
social scenarios with repeated interactions between multiple agents; however,
Hobbes identifies a similar, strict dominance of mutual distrust in the state of
nature that the prisoner’s dilemma suggests. From this, he extrapolates the
requirement of a central authority charged with implementing and securing
mutually beneficial cooperation. Weislingen arrives at a comparable conclusion:
the princes assure (and can, contrary to the emperor, enforce) cooperation and
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guarantee its inherent payoffs. The idea of rationally (artificially, not naturally)
implemented self-interest is therefore deeply embedded in the moral design of
Weislingen’s political view: abiding by the laws, “playing it by the rule,” pays off.
Everybody wins.
In Goethe’s play, the prospect of mutual gain is thus thrown into sharp relief
as an intrinsic part of social contracts: it is also inextricably connected to rational
anticipation and decision making. Insofar as Adelheid and Weislingen are
the conspicuous driving force of the plot, the play suggests a proximity of power-
craving machination and Hobbesian contractarianism under the banner of self-
interest. In this sense, the state theorist Hasso Hofmann highlighted the
economic character of classic contractarianism, since it not only focuses on indi-
vidual happiness as a prerequisite and measure of sociality, but, and this is
of particular importance, also assumes that individuals act rationally and self-
interestedly.40 In both contexts—economy and contractarianism—social inter-
action can only be understood in terms of reciprocity, a quid pro quo. Against
this reductionist notion of sociality, the play pits its eponymous protagonist G€otz
with his multi-faceted ideas of honor and loyalty: however, he is set up for failure
against an overwhelming new reality which was already firmly established by
the eighteenth century.41
THE BASIS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Friedrich Schiller’s Fiesco
Goethe was not the only one to question the ostensibly natural self-evidence of
the social contract. In another Sturm und Drang play, Schiller similarly detected
difficulties with contractarian propositions: the complex “republican tragedy”
Fiesco’s Conspiracy at Genoa, which—as the title suggests—revolves around pol-
itics, governance, and legitimacy, carefully aligns the individual history of its
protagonists with the fate of the Genoese Republic, thus implying that the indi-
vidual characters and their long-established personal and social relations cannot
simply be omitted from any political model which seeks to explain and justify
specific forms of government, but are an intrinsic, historically relevant part of it.
In line with my overall argument, I will focus on one scene in the play, in
which the ambitious Fiesco recreates a social contract scenario: at an assembly of
the Genoese citizens, Fiesco sketches out a thinly veiled analogy to the actual
political situation in Genoa, referring to his opponent as a butcher’s dog: “It was
his custom to drive the animals to slaughter, so he lived like a dog in his king-
dom, barked, bit, and gnawed at the bones of his people. The nation grumbled;
the boldest came together and strangled their princely bulldog. [… ] Now a
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general assembly was held to decide upon the important question: what the best
form of government would be.”42
The audience interjects, demanding a democracy; and Fiesco confirms that
the animals did so too: after its introduction, however, war is declared on the ani-
mals and, since “the Lamb, Hare, Stag, Donkey, the entire world of insects, the
whole shy army of birds and fishes—all intervened and wailed: Peace,”43 they are
finally subjugated by men. Another heckler then postulates a select government
which, Fiesco is quick to confirm, was indeed adopted: “Wolves saw to finance,
foxes became their secretaries. Doves took charge of criminal justice, tigers of
pleas and settlements, billy goats heard domestic disputes. The hares became sol-
diers; lions and elephant guarded the baggage train. The Donkey was the state
ambassador, and the Mole oversaw the administration of all departments.”44
He relates this fable with Machiavellian aplomb, elegantly undermining
Enlightenment ideas of Selbstdenken (self-thinking) which are usually associated
with the fable genre. In it, the monarchy emerges as the only viable form of gov-
ernment with Fiesco as its ideal ruler; but the fable does more. Quite fundamen-
tally, it implies a contract theoretical scenario in which the animals—rationally,
on the face of it—agree on the form of government which benefits everyone. All
of that is in keeping with key assumptions of contractarianism: the normative
legitimacy of the rules decided upon stems from the mutuality of the agreement.
Fiesco’s speech and the subsequent debate also purportedly intend to assess
the best rational strategy to maximize the citizens’ personal interests; all of this
compels the citizens to assent to a new (rather than a first, as in Leviathan) gov-
ernmental authority, thus emulating processes that are at play in contractarian
scenarios. Obviously, in Fiesco, the procedure falls significantly short of the force-
ful argument Hobbes makes with his thought experiment. Applied to this con-
crete scenario, it transpires that personal interest and rational decision making
cannot be relied on, as the protagonist blatantly manipulates his listeners with
his highly suggestive, albeit not entirely stringent conclusions.45 More import-
antly, however, the contractual proposition—misused as a vehicle for Fiesco’s
ambitions—is in and of itself weak. Schiller’s play already grapples with a spe-
cific ‘temporal’ dilemma, as Fiesco’s ‘contract’ does not seem to require any pre-
conditions. In other words: it suggests that any contract on which people are
willing to agree rationally is viable, disregarding any other form of previous com-
mitment. In his rejection of this notion, Schiller approximates Hegel’s objections
to Hobbes’s social contract. For Hegel, the social contract cannot stipulate its
own premises and is thus merely arbitrary. In Fiesco, Schiller seems to argue
similarly that conventions must be based on a non-conventionalist basis in order
to lay claim to legitimacy. For Hegel, recognition is the precondition which per-
mits contracts in the first place.46 The contract can only be understood as a con-
vention between independent and free-willed individuals who anticipate an
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emergent, mutual, and identical will. As opposed to Schiller,47 Hegel was deeply
suspicious of Kant’s individualistic moral philosophy. He contrasted the categor-
ial prioritization of the individual with the idea of a morally fully integrated soci-
ety, sidestepping the temporal loop and replacing it with an evolutionary
trajectory which traverses through different stages.48
The philosopher Thomas Scanlon has explicitly formulated ideas which reson-
ate with Schiller’s implications: “Besides being motivated by their own interests,
Scanlon takes persons also to be moved by a certain form of respect for others.
This leads to a [… ] contract theory of interpersonal morality.”49 In this sense,
Scanlon, much like Schiller, proceeds from a more extensive moral concept of
right and wrong: “[A]n act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behav-
ior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general
agreement.”50 He suggests a form of contractualism in which people ought to be
guided “by a different kind of motivation, namely the aim of finding principles
that others, insofar as they too have this aim, could not reasonably reject”:51 The
question then would not be “what would be most likely to advance [persons’]
interests or to produce agreement in their actual circumstances or in any more
idealized situation, but rather a judgement about the suitability of certain princi-
ples to serve as the basis of mutual recognition and accommodation.”52
By ridiculing the flawed foundational moment in the play (and by generally
exposing Fiesco’s personal weaknesses which mainly stem from his ambition and
his negligence of others), Schiller endorses a more holistic viewpoint, defined by
mutual respect, recognition, and a social development of morality, echoing
aspects in Hegel’s evolutionary argument. He additionally anticipates criticisms
of communitarian theories, which point out that the self must find “its moral
identity in and through its membership.”53 No individual that enters the contrac-
tual negotiations can be seen as an “unencumbered self” as contractarianism
seems to require: “[A]s our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider
subject than the individual alone, whether a family or a tribe or city or class or
nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitu-
tive sense.”54
In the play, it is striking that Fiesco’s failure to communicate and engage
meaningfully with his spouse feeds directly into the politically relevant plot:
when he eventually kills his wife in a political battle due to a tragic misunder-
standing (which arises from his secrecy with which he surrounds itself even in
his private life), Schiller further emphasises the integral importance of reciprocal
recognition between individuals as an indispensable premise for any legitimate
form of governance; providing the organic framework for such appropriate, social
interactions appears the ultimate and solely justifiable goal of politics in the
play. Fiesco, the vibrant Sturm und Drang character, is in this sense already
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tied to the notion of Bildung, albeit only ex negativo. For Schiller, Bildung in this
sense focuses on the individual interaction with the collective, ‘society’; it must
precede any distinct improvement of the ‘state’, an insight which he articulates
very clearly after the French Revolution in his Briefe €uber die €asthetische
Erziehung (Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, 1795).55
CONTRACTS AND SOVEREIGNTY IN GOETHE’S GÖTZ VON BERLICHINGEN
In view of a more comprehensive anthropological morality that necessarily ante-
dates any contractual bond, Schiller therefore places the temporality of the social
contract in question. In Goethe’s G€otz, further problems come to the fore.
Common objections against Hobbes often highlight the circular layout of the
foundational myth, as it projects back important prerequisites onto the state of
nature.56 The separation of a clearly defined before and after is indeed rejected
in Goethe’s play, in which G€otz, after his imperial ban, finds himself simultan-
eously without and within the boundaries of sovereign power.
In his commentary on Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriff des Politischen (The Concept
of the Political, 1932), Leo Strauss emphasizes the distinct spatio-temporal dis-
junction of the civil order from the status naturalis which underpins
Hobbes’s approach57:
The political, which Schmitt brings out as fundamental, is the
‘state of nature’ prior to all culture; Schmitt restores Hobbes’s
conception of the state of nature to a place of honor. That
provides the answer to the question within which genus the
specific difference of the political is to be placed: the political is
the status of man, indeed the human status in the sense of the
‘natural’, the fundamental and extreme status of men.58
Giorgio Agamben—intensifying Carl Schmitt’s criticism of Hobbes—is equally
interested in the distinction between the state of nature and the Commonwealth
which is founded by the Hobbesian covenant. For him the state of nature is—as
an “inclusive exclusion”—a constituent of the established civil order and thus no
longer pre-political and merely antecedent or spatially external. For Agamben,
the state of nature does not precede sovereign power, but is rather a product
of it:
Sovereignty thus presents itself as the incorporation of the state
of nature in society, or, if one prefers, as a state of indistinction
between nature and culture, between violence and law, and this
very indistinction constitutes specifically sovereign violence. The
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state of nature is therefore not truly external to nomos but
rather contains its virtuality.59
William Rasch summarizes these conclusions as follows: “The political does not
replace nature; it creates it. The state from which Hobbes’s sovereign rescues us
is the state into which Agamben’s sovereign plunges us.”60
In Goethe’s play, the social contract which supposedly puts an end to the
state of nature is brought into question in a strikingly similar manner: if one
takes another look at the dense explanation Weislingen provides, it is remark-
able that G€otz also features as the wolf threatening the pastoral prince. This
twofold metaphorical reference on the one hand alludes to the danger to which
the prince is exposed—as formulated in Machiavelli’s famous advice that the
prince must be wary of his feral enemies, the wolves.61 On the other hand, it
refers to the state of nature in Hobbes, where a man is a wolf to another man
(homo homini lupus). In Weislingen’s mini-narrative, G€otz finds himself outside
the commonwealth which is sustained and guaranteed by the power of the
prince. When G€otz eventually faces the imperial ban, which is meant to punish
him for his sedition, he metamorphoses into what Giorgio Agamben terms a
homo sacer. In the eponymous book Homo Sacer I, Agamben proposes a heuristic-
ally useful differentiation between bare life (zoe) and politically qualified life
(bios). According to him, it is the law which defines the threshold between zoe
and bios. Zoe, bare life, is the life that is excluded from the protective law, just
as G€otz is towards the end, when his existence is no longer politically qualified:
The sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill
without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice,
and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not
sacrificed—is the life that has been captured in this sphere. [… ]
What is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim who
may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer.62
This definition of sovereignty distinctly differs from the rational thought experi-
ment in contractarianism. The changing of G€otz’s political fates, however, seems
to corroborate Agamben’s analysis. From the perspective of power, G€otz’s oscilla-
tion between “wolf” (zoe) and man (bios) quite accurately describes Agamben’s
“threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and
nomos, exclusion and inclusion.”63 G€otz as a wolf-man also sheds light on “the
Hobbesian mythologeme of the state of nature. [… ] at issue is not simply fera
bestia and natural life but rather a zone of indistinction between the human and
the animal.”64 Goethe seemed to be acutely aware of such a troubling under-
standing of sovereignty which departs from Hobbes’s contractarian paradigm.
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In the end, G€otz comes to represent a tragic anachronism as he finds himself
locked in a transitional state, still clinging to old forms of organization while
being subjected to new social and political forces: Weislingen’s narrative also
casts G€otz as a wolf that opposes beneficial developments and constitutes an
obvious public danger to the community and the prince who protects it. G€otz
ultimately lives up to Weislingen’s destructive image by forging a fatal alliance
with the protagonists of the German Peasants’ War. His dramatically inevitable
(but historically false) death clarifies that he does not represent an alternative to
the new legal and governmental developments in the sixteenth (and, indirectly,
the eighteenth) century. The play does not suggest a return to older and better
times but offers an incisive analysis of the problems and pitfalls of the emerging
modern state. It undermines the self-explanatory master narrative of the social
contract by navigating, redefining, recharging a common set of metaphors (among
them, as I have tried to highlight throughout this argument, also virtually omni-
present comparisons, such as animal similes) and thus ultimately disrupting the
intuitive grasp of the contract metaphor.
Many scholars have argued that one can only side with G€otz by disregarding
the benefits of modern civilization. Against the gory backdrop of the martial feud
G€otz stokes up, the state monopoly on legitimate violence materializes as an
important disciplining and pacifying force. Philosophers such as Norbert Elias
and Steven Pinker have scrutinized such developments from this angle: “The
Leviathan, a state and judiciary with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
can defuse the [individual] temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse
for revenge, and circumvent [… ] self-serving biases.”65 Their interpretation also
broadly draws on the social contract as an intuitively comprehensible solution to
the problems of distribution and cooperation which puts an end to individual vio-
lence; in Pinker’s case it becomes particularly clear that self-interest as an initial
motivation is naturally sublimated in the sphere of the social contract where
everybody benefits. This notion of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence in
the context of contractarianism is, however, as I have tried to show, less straight-
forward in Goethe’s play than the contract metaphor at first insinuates.
In his pursuit of glory, much like Adelheid and Weislingen, Fiesco is driven
by self-interest; the conclusion of the contract in the play underscores a similar
rational awareness of one’s best interest based on which the best result is negoti-
ated. Schiller, in unison with Thomas Scanlon as it were, understands “the rele-
vant agreement as governed by a moral idea of mutual respect, one that would
be inconsistent, indeed, with bargaining over fundamental terms of association in
the way contractarianism proposes.”66 In Fiesco, Schiller suggests that mutual
respect would allow us to escape the traps of contract theory. Without yet spell-
ing out a coherent concept of recognition, Schiller deviates from the more imme-
diately accessible notion of a contract: individual identity for him is processual
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and dialogically connected with the corresponding social environment.67 On this
basis, the play emphatically deconstructs Hobbes’s contractarianism as inappro-
priate, if not illogical.
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